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ABSTRACT 
 
Jean Baudrillard's concept of "symbolic exchange" represents an important concept in 
understanding why Marx's prediction regarding the collapse of capitalism has not been 
realized. Baudrillard adds to the Marxian concepts of use value and exchange value, 
suggesting that, in today's consumer-oriented society, commodities take on a symbolic 
value that constitutes their "status" and, therefore, power. In the Western industrial 
societies that are "networked" into information cultures, the generation of symbolic value 
results from a constantly changing symbolic environment in which new demands for 
access to symbolic status are generated. Baudrillard sees the United States as the farthest 
along on the path to a simulated environment of symbolic exchange. Manufacturing for 
symbolic exchange is directed toward the production of the fetish: an object that is 
positioned purely for its symbolic value. By directing production increasingly in the 
direction of the fetish, as an object to be used in symbolic exchange, capitalism is able to 
sustain itself even after the material needs of the population are satisfied. 
 
 
ARTICLE 
Introduction 
 Questions surrounding production, distribution, and consumption have been 
central to discussions of politics since the time of Plato. These issues were given new 
relevance in the modern period by the analysis and critique of Karl Marx in his 
discussion of the relationship between economic organizations and the distribution of 
power in society. However, despite Marx‘s prediction of capitalism‘s coming collapse, 
capitalism continues to expand, even into the twenty-first century. Marx‘s claims 
regarding capitalism‘s demise have not been manifest.  
 Critical political theory approaches theoretical discourse as an open rather than a 
closed process. Due to this approach, it can offer an explanation regarding the continued 
existence of the capitalist economic system that is both informed regarding the tenets of 
Marxist thought, and sympathetic to its aims, but which can also critique Marx‘s analysis 
and add to it conceptual base. Of particular interest in this regard is the work of the 
French social theorist, Jean Baudrillard. Along with Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, 
and others of the French movement known as postmodernism, Baudrillard is concerned 
with the intersections of power, social organization, and the material aspect of social life. 
However, the role played by Marxist thought in Baudrillard‘s writings has been an issue 
of debate among both his supporters and critics. 
 In the secondary literature on Baudrillard it is often argued that while Baudrillard 
was influenced by the work of Karl Marx in his early years, he made, with the publication 
of Mirror of Production, a conscious break with the Marxian project. As Dougles Kellner 
contends, with Mirror of Production "Baudrillard rejects Marxism entirely" (Kellner 
1989, 39). The claim is that after his initial training in Marxist theory, Baudrillard 
became influenced by the writings of Nietzsche, Weber, and postmodernism. Mark Poster 
asserts a similar position (Poster, 1988). It is argued that these influences led Baudrillard 
away from his Marxist roots. Hence, as Paul Hegarty explains "Baudrillard's work has 
often been characterized as having a 'before and after', in terms of a break with Marxism" 
(Hagarty 2004, 13). Such a break would relegate the significance of production in 
Baudrillard's work to a secondary status.  
 However, in contrast to much of the secondary literature, this paper argues that 
Baudrillard never abandoned the central dynamic of the Marxian project. More 
specifically, Baudrillard remains interested in the way in which the conditions of 
production and consumption establish the context for the entire social order. Like Marx, 
Baudrillard sees production as undergoing developmental transformations. Both 
production and consumption alter the conditions in which the social and political 
institutions are formulated. 
Baudrillard is interested in the question of how capitalism has continued to sustain 
itself amidst abundance. In order to explain this Baudrillard introduces the notion of 
―symbolic exchange‖ or ―sign exchange.‖ Sign exchange is a process in which goods are 
exchanged as commodities, but with the new element of symbolic value, or status, they 
provide the consumer. Symbolic value presents a new explanatory tool in the discussion 
of value and is designed to augment the explanatory power of use value and exchange 
value in a consumption oriented society (Baudrillard 1981, 123-29).  
 Such a claim allows Baudrillard to develop the idea of ―fetishism‖ in the 
production process in a way that goes beyond the Marxian formulation. Marx introduces 
the idea of fetish value in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Over the 
last twenty years Baudrillard has built a conceptual framework for the understanding of 
fetishism within contemporary capitalism. This framework develops in the discussion of 
simulacrum and ―simulation.‖ Sign value emerges as the new key term for analyzing 
value in a consumer society, one in which the fetishism of commodities is complemented 
by a new fetishism attached only to the symbolic value of objects.   
This work is divided into five sections. The first outlines Baudrillard‘s concept of 
simulation, which is essential to understanding the significance of symbolic and sign 
exchange in relation to Baudrillard‘s notion of the hyperreal. The second section 
discusses symbolic consumption as a manifestation of simulacrum and simulation proper. 
Section three draws on Baudrillard‘s discussion of America in order to examine the 
impact of later orders of simulacrum and fetishized production. Section four returns to 
Marx, examining the place of Baudrillard‘s orders of value in the context of Marxist 
theory. Section five deals with the significance of new kinds of fetishism for politics. 
 
 
I. Simulation: From Stucco to the Fetish 
 
 Central to the understanding of Baudrillard‘s work is the concept of simulation. 
Baudrillard argues that our social reality is a construction, what he terms the 
―simulacrum.‖ The simulacrum is a symbolic order of value. It is our apparent external 
reality, the ―truth‖ of the order of social existence. However, for Baudrillard, the 
simulacrum has its roots in the processes of production. In ―The Orders of Simulacra,‖ 
first published in 1976, (Baudrillard 1976, 50-84) Baudrillard outlines the historical 
development of simulacrum (Baudrillard, 1983). It is in this development of simulacrum 
that he formalizes the historical development of the object as sign. Social and political 
status is assigned in relation to the possession of objects. How those objects are produced, 
therefore, has links to the distribution of status and power within the society. 
 In ―The Orders of Simulacra,‖ Baudrillard organizes his discussion of the 
production of the symbolic order into three ―orders of appearance:‖ counterfeit, 
production and simulation proper. (In his more recent work he discusses a fourth state, 
the fractal stage.) These stages of historical development are central to his discussion of 
the object as a commodity and as a representation of social power. According to 
Baudrillard, the order of the counterfeit arises in the Renaissance as a reaction to the 
feudal order. He conceptualizes the feudal order as closed system of signs in which all the 
relations of signs are obligatory: ―[a]n interdiction protects the signs and assures them 
total clarity; each sign then refers unequivocally to a status‖ (Baudrillard 1983, 84). In the 
feudal order every sign is inseparably linked to its signifier, and there is no class or sign 
mobility. However, with the coming of the Renaissance, a new order of signs is born–the 
counterfeit. 
 Baudrillard marks the Renaissance as the end of the ―obliged sign‖ (Baudrillard 
1983, 85). For Baudrillard, such Enlightenment ideas as human equality, natural law, and 
transcendental reason force a change in the obligatory feudal order of signs. In the 
Renaissance, the sign is no longer tied inseparably to its signifier; signs are no longer 
―obliged,‖ but rather, society has become a ―proliferation‖ of signs ―that all classes will 
partake of equally‖ (Baudrillard 1983, 85). This lack of obligation is exemplified in the 
Renaissance concept of ―natural law‖ (Baudrillard 1983, 86). A concept which 
represents, for Baudrillard, the ambition of bringing all signs under a unitary governing 
principle.  
 The Renaissance world was ones in which all signs were governed by the unitary 
principle of natural law. This project is exemplified in the creation of an order in which 
the substitute takes on the character of the real. In the Baroque period, this substitution 
was carried out with the use of stucco. Baudrillard sees in the ―prowesses of stucco and 
the baroque art… the new ambition of the Renaissance man,‖ which is ―the 
transubstantiation of all nature into unique substance… [the] ambition to exorcise the 
natural substance of a thing in order to substitute a synthetic core‖ (Baudrillard 1983, 87). 
It is here that Baudrillard first introduces the political and social ramifications of 
simulacra.  
 He says, ―simulacra are not only a game played with signs; they imply social 
rapports and social powers‖ (Baudrillard 1983, 88). The project of creating a world 
grounded on a unitary principle assumes a certain social and political agenda. For 
Baudrillard, this agenda is clearly one of ―universal hegemony,‖ for ―everything testifies 
already—not in production, but in counterfeit to the same project of control and universal 
hegemony—to a social scheme where the internal coherence of a system is already at 
work‖ (Baudrillard 1983, 89-90). Even at this early stage Baudrillard identifies the logic 
of simulation as a system of control, a system whose goal is to build the perfect, docile 
society, in which its hegemony, through the ordering of all signs, is indestructible–a 
society made out of ―plastic‖ (Baudrillard 1983, 91). However, the Counterfeit order is 
only the beginning, for the Industrial Revolution augments the production and ordering of 
signs.  
 The logic of signs changes in the passing from the Renaissance to the Industrial 
Revolution. 
The first-order simulacrum never abolished difference. It supposes an 
always-detectable alteration between semblance and reality… The second-
order simulacrum simplifies the problem by the absorption of appearance, 
or by the liquidation of the real (Baudrillard 1983, 94-95). 
 
In the Renaissance (the first order) the project was creation, the building of a 
world based on signs rooted in natural law. In the Industrial period (the second order) the 
goal is (re)production. With the coming of the Industrial Revolution it is no longer a 
matter of the singular creation of signs; rather, it is a matter of the equivalent production 
of signs. Hence, with industry the organizing principle of the sign shifts form ―natural 
law‖ to ―mercantile value.‖  
 The intensification of the logic of capitalism and the rises of mercantile value 
eliminates the need for the sign‘s relation to its ―original (or signified).‖ Rather in the age 
of industry, what matters is the total equivalence of signs. Mercantile value, as the 
industrial base of the sign, is only interested in (re)production. It is only through the 
ability to mass-produce, through the ability to create a ―series,‖ that money, value, and 
signs come to be distributed (Baudrillard 1983, 97). This leads, according to Baudrillard, 
to the ―obliteration of the original reference,‖ since it is not necessary or valuable to have 
an ―original‖ in a system whose goal is equivalence. Consequently, with the emergence 
of the Industrial Revolution, the original is replaced by the logic of the ―series.‖ Serial 
reproduction is, for Baudrillard, ―a revolution‖ (Baudrillard 1983, 99). In reproduction, 
the techniques of production are the sole determiner of an objects use and exchange 
value. In this logic there is, according to Baudrillard, no longer a need for the distinction, 
which Marx makes between use value and exchange value, for both are lost in the 
equivalence generated by the techniques of reproducibility.  
 At this stage of capitalism it is the technique of reproduction itself that ascribes all 
value, meaning, and reality. No longer are products determined by their use value. 
Rather, they are all ―conceived from the point-of-view of their reproducibility‖ 
(Baudrillard 1983, 100). At this stage, ―[o]nly affiliation to the model makes sense, and 
nothing flows any longer according to its end, but proceeds from the model, the ‗signifier 
of reference‘‖ (Baudrillard 1983, 101). In order to make reproduction possible, there 
must be a ―model‖ or ―code‖ from which replicas are generated. It is this concept of 
―code‖ that, for Baudrillard, proclaims the move into the third order of simulacra, the 
move from reproducibility to the ―code‖ as the basis of value. 
 In the third order one enters what Baudrillard calls the ―metaphysics of the code‖ 
(Baudrillard 1983, 103). 
The great simulacra constructed by man pass from a universe of natural 
laws to a universe of force and tension of force, today to a universe of 
structure and binary opposition. After the metaphysics of being and 
appearance, after that of energy of determination, comes that of 
indeterminacy and the code (Baudrillard, 1983; 103). 
 
 For Baudrillard, the single-minded focus of the Industrial Revolution on 
reproducibility introduces a ―new operational configuration… Digitality is its 
metaphysical principle, and DNA its prophet‖ (Baudrillard 1983, 103). It is a 
configuration ―whose value is purely tactical… and whose structure is that of a macro-
molecular code of command and control‖ (Baudrillard 1983, 104). The productivity of 
the Industrial Revolution creates a structural configuration in which the process of 
reproduction has come to constitute the world, in the same way that DNA constitutes the 
biological world. ―The question of signs, of their rational destination, their real or 
imaginary, their repression, their deviation, the illusion they create or that which they 
conceal, or their parallel meanings—all of that is erased‖ (Baudrillard 1983, 104). Just as 
the basis for all human biology is reducible to the single dimension of the DNA, the 
world (after the success of the Industrial Revolution) is reducible to a form of ―binary 
opposition‖ and ―digitality,‖ in which all reality is reduced to the ―the mystic elegance… 
of the zero and the one‖ (Baudrillard 1983, 106). In this new order, society has become 
―an erased record, unchangeable, of which we are no more than cells-for-reading‖ 
(Baudrillard 1983, 105). 
 With the reduction of all value to the single dimension of reproducibility, with the 
destruction of any value difference between being and appearance, between the real and 
the represented, reality has, for Baudrillard, imploded into a system of ―binary 
opposition.‖ In a code-ordered system all questions and answers are always already 
determined, since, ―the code is itself but a genetic cell, a generator where myriads of 
intersections produce all the questions and possible solutions, so that choices (by whom?) 
can be made‖ (Baudrillard 1983, 105). For Baudrillard, the ―code‖ of reproduction 
emerges as the DNA of social value; it is society‘s referent, base, and ―teleological 
principle.‖   
  The ―code‖ closes the gap between the real and the illusory by presenting 
itself as the real; it is that ―from which all being proceeds‖ (Baudrillard 1983, 106). The 
code is the foundation on which a prescriptive order for social life rests. Once the code is 
determined, the social and political order are to be shaped in its image. The project of 
creating a single, unitary conception of reality from which all social and political 
arrangements follow as a deductive application of ―truth‖ is secured within a new system 
in which truth and value are determined. It is the exploration of the logic of ―the code‖ 
which occupies much of Baudrillard‘s work during the 1980s.  
  However, in 1987 there is a shift in Baudrillard‘s thinking concerning the 
logic of the code and the concept of simulation, a shift toward a new concept of the 
fetish, a shift toward ecstasy rather than desire. Here Baudrillard begins his discussion of 
the fractal stage. 
Everything began with the object, yet there is no longer a system of 
objects. The critique of the object was based on signs saturated with 
meaning, along with their phantasies and unconscious logic as well as 
their prestigious differential logic. Behind this dual logic lies the 
anthropological dream: the dream of the object as existing beyond and 
above exchange and use, above and beyond equivalence; the dream of the 
sacrificial logic of gift, expenditure, potlatch, ‗devil‘s share consumption, 
symbolic exchange . . . All this still exists, and simultaneously it is 
disappearing (Baudrillard 1987, 11). 
 
Baudrillard contends that the whole system of simulacra, as the analyses of the 
object as sign, is today disappearing. There are two important distinctions in this shift. 
The first is the move from the concept of the code, to that of the network. The second is 
the move from ―the system of objects‖ to ―the destiny of the object.‖ In the earlier form 
of simulation ―the code‖ was the system by which value was assigned and determine. 
However, in a world of increasing communication the logic of ―the code‖ is replaced by 
the logic of ―the network.‖ With the logic of the network the line between the ordering 
principle of the code and the object, or signs that it evaluates and organizes, is in a 
significant sense, completely effaced. In the network objects cease to be signs. Where 
once there was a relation of objects to the symbolic order in the form of exchange, where 
once there was the challenge of the code to the object, today there is something beyond 
objects. This is not to suggest that objects have disappeared; rather it is to suggest that 
they have become visible only in it relation to the new environment of the network.  
The order of symbolic exchange was predicated on a space, a ―challenge‖ 
between the code and the object. However, in a system ordered by the network there is no 
longer room for the challenge. Baudrillard elaborates his position by saying, ―[t]he object 
itself takes the initiative of reversibility‖ (Baudrillard 1987, 80). It is in this shift from the 
code to the network that we enter what Baudrillard calls the ―fractal stage of value‖ 
(Baudrillard 1993, 5). 
 Baudrillard describes the fractal stage as what comes ―after the orgy.‖ All the 
substance of the symbolic order, desire, seduction, liberation, all of aspects of symbolic 
exchange have today returned to haunt the network of social value. At this stage the 
economy of value becomes pure simulation where ―there is no point of reference at all, 
and value radiates in all directions, occupying all interstices, without reference to 
anything whatsoever, by virtue of pure contiguity‖ (Baudrillard 1993, 5). For Baudrillard 
the system of value has, today, surpassed itself in the complete ―contiguity‖ of the 
signified and the signifier – the code and the object. However, this raises a question. In a 
system in which ―value radiates in all direction,‖ in a system which has surpassed itself as 
a system, what can be said about it? What is the logic of a system past logic? The answer 
is fetishism.  
It is in the concept of fetishism that Baudrillard‘s project takes up a new the 
question or ―destiny‖ of the object. In his early works, Baudrillard traced the 
development of the object as sign, which is the logic of simulation. However, with the 
move from the code to the network, the object and its system are erased. Yet, the object 
emerges as an object again, but not an object in a real sense. Rather, it is an object as 
fetish (Baudrillard 2001, 129). The commodity, which once contained elements of use 
value and exchange value, now has been transformed in to pure symbolic value. This 
occurs as the commodity now acquires it value only in relation to the network of 
commodities in circulation.  
In a system of objects there is a relation and an ordering principle. With the move 
past the system there is no longer a demarcation between the object and the system, 
between the symbolic and the sign. Therefore, the object is forced past it own existence, 
past its ordering principle and into the realm of the fetish. 
So initially, the real object becomes sign: this is the stage of simulation. 
But in a subsequent stage the sign becomes an object again, but not a real 
object: an object much further removed from the real than the sign itself – 
and object . . . outside representation: a fetish (Baudrillard 2001, 129).  
 
 At this stage one can no longer talk about either representation or value in a 
proper sense. Rather one is forced to face the object as beyond representation, beyond 
good and evil, as pure fetish. Here Baudrillard brings his analyses of the object full-
circle. However, what is it that links his earlier conception of the object to his later 
conception of the object? What makes Baudrillard‘s analysis possible and holds his 
analysis together? The answer is embedded in his relationship to Marx.             
 
 
II. Consumption: Both Sign and Fetish 
 
 Baudrillard traces the development of the object from its birth as sign to its quasi-
death as fetish. Yet a question still remains. What is it that made all of this possible? Out 
of what process does the hyperreal, the code, the object as sign, the concept of simulation 
emerge? The answer is ―consumerism.‖ In The Consumer Society, Baudrillard asserts that 
consumption functions as a language. Consumption is a means by which humans 
communicate and interact with one another. Hence, in his analysis of consumption 
Baudrillard ―deploy[s] the whole panoply of tools derived from structuralist linguistics 
including sign, signifier, signified, and code‖ (Baudrillard 1970, 6).  In this system, 
―commodities are no longer defined by their use, but rather by what they signify. And 
what they signify is defined not by what they do, but by their relationship to the entire 
system of commodities and signs‖ (Baudrillard 1970, 7). People no longer simply 
consume objects, but rather they consume objects laden with symbolic meaning, they 
consume objects, because objects signify more than their use. One‘s car, one‘s house, and 
one‘s brand of toothpaste are no longer simply objects for consumption, with use and 
exchange value. Rather they are symbols, signs of one‘s happiness, success, affluence, or 
penury.  
 For Baudrillard, this consumption of objects as signs has thoroughly infiltrated 
society. ―We are at the point where consumption is laying hold of the whole of life‖ 
(Baudrillard 1970, 29). All commodities are, according to Baudrillard, laden with 
symbolic value, which has eclipsed their utility and monetary values. Baudrillard 
describes the shift to the object as sign as ―a revolution which has put an end to [the] 
‗classical‘ economics of value‖ (Baudrillard 1976, 6). In this symbolic system of 
consumption, the structural value of signs eclipses classical terms such as ―use value‖ and 
―exchange value.‖ The objects as sign, ordered by the code of simulation, becomes the 
measure of value: ―The system of reference for production, signification, the affect, 
substance and history, all this equivalence to ‗real‘ content, loading the sign with the 
burden of ‗utility,‘ with gravity . . . all this is over with‖ (Baudrillard 1976, 6-7).  
 Sign value is completely independent of ‗real‘ utility or content. At this level, 
commodities, all of whose values have become symbolically determined, are exchanged 
and valued only in relation to other signs, only in relation to the system of signs itself. 
Thus, ―[r]eferential value is annihilated, giving the structural play of value the upper 
hand‖ (Baudrillard 1976, 6). Real, ―referential‖ value has been replaced by structural 
play, by the pure, symbolic interplay of signs. It is in the shift from use/exchange value to 
sign value that the commodity enters simulation proper.  
 With the shift from use/exchange value to sign value, from referential value to 
structural value, the commodity loses any necessary cohesion with the ―real:‖ ―Now the 
other [structural] stage of value has the upper hand, a total relativity, general 
commutation, combination and simulation – simulation, in the sense that, from now on, 
signs are exchanged against each other rather than against the real‖ (Baudrillard 1976, 7). 
This ―emancipation of the sign‖ from the real is an unavoidable result of the emergence 
of sign value.   
 In a symbolic system of value there is absolutely no room for the real as referent. 
The real is, by definition, non-symbolic and concrete. Therefore, in the system of 
consumption described by Baudrillard, in which value is purely symbolic, and the object 
is pure sign, the real has no value as a secure point of meaning. However, rather than 
being simply an extension of Baudrillard‘s earlier discussion of the code and simulation, 
consumerism appears as the process which makes simulation possible. More precisely, it 
is the shift from the object as use/exchange value to the object as sign value that allows 
simulation to develop. 
 In order for reality to implode into simulation, one important shift must occur. 
The real, the non-symbolic, the concrete commodity must be replaced as the referent of 
value. This is precisely what the shift from use/exchange value to sign value allows. As 
already discussed, the real cannot anchor a system of value whose point of reference is 
symbolic, just as the concrete commodity has no place in a system of objects as signs. 
Therefore, this shift, which makes the referent of value symbolic, rather than concrete, is 
directly responsible for the elimination of the real in its conventional sense. It is this shift 
that makes the real obsolete and valueless. In short, the system of objects and simulation, 
which dominants Baudrillard‘s early works, is made possible only through his 
augmentation of the Marxian concept of value and commodity. This unstated logic is 
implicit in Baudrillard‘s system. What is important to note is that while it has been 
argued that Baudrillard‘s redescription of value represents a complete ―break‖ with Marx, 
it is possible to assign this analyses another meaning. As Baudrillard himself affirms 
when he says:  
Value thus had a natural aspect, a commodity aspect, and a structural 
aspect. These distinctions are formal ones . . . reminiscent of the 
distinctions between the particles physicists are always coming up with. A 
new particle does not replace those discovered earlier: it simply joins their 
ranks . . . So let me introduce a new particle into the microphysics of 
simulacra . . . the fractal stage (Baudrillard 1994, 5). 
 
 For Baudrillard, none of the stages of value he illuminates are formal breaks with 
the Marxian conception of value. Rather they are augmentations which take their place in 
the ―microphysics of simulacra.‖ The concept of simulation and the development of the 
object as sign are, as shown above, made possible by the augmentation of the Marxian 
conception of value. Also the later development of the object as fetish, which comes to 
dominant Baudrillard‘s later work, is again clearly a development and augmentation of 
the Marxian concept, for ―[i]n Marx‘s analysis, the formal analysis of the commodity 
grounds a first level fetishism, connected with exchange value. But when the passion for 
value becomes embodied, beyond value . . . this becomes the object of a higher 
fetishism‖ (Baudrillard 2001, 129). Thus both Baudrillard‘s conceptions of the object as 
sign and as fetish stand in a positive relationship to Marx. This is significant in that it 
implies an on going relationship between Marx‘s critical analysis and Baudrillard‘s 
project, a relationship most meaningfully expressed as a critique of consumption.  
 If the rise of simulation and the object as sign are tied to the consumption of signs 
over commodities (an association that seems reasonable), and if the move to the object as 
fetish is an augmentation of Marx‘s concept of fetishism, which itself implies a relation 
to consumption, then it must be the case that uneven modes of global consumption imply 
uneven distribution of both simulation as ―code‖ and as ―fetish.‖ Further, one can 
conclude from this association that one would find the highest levels of simulation (in 
both senses) in societies with the greatest amount of consumerism. This would certainly 
explain Baudrillard‘s fascination with the United States. 
 
 
III. Simulation, America, and the Production of the Fetish 
 
 America is where the importance of Baudrillard‘s discussion of symbolic 
consumption manifests its most acute symptoms. Today, America is the place where 
simulation and the production of the fetish have reached its zenith. A brief look at 
statistics shows that America leads the world in consumption. America is five percent of 
the world‘s population and consumes forty percent of the world‘s goods (Chomsky 1994, 
99). What explains the fact that amidst abundance, Americans work the longest hours and 
have the fewest holidays and vacations? Awash in salad-shooters, microwaves, and hand-
held computers, what keeps Americans marching ever forward in their consumptive 
frenzy? 
 Here the notion of symbolic exchange becomes an important explanatory tool for 
understanding the conditions of late capitalism. To Baudrillard, America displays the 
most advanced symptoms of simulation. In his book, America, Baudrillard describes the 
United States as ―astral,‖ appearing to come from the stars, as not from this world. For 
Baudrillard ―there is no truth of America‖ (Baudrillard 1986, 27). America is, ―neither 
dream nor reality. It is a hyperreality‖ (Baudrillard 1986, 28). He continues:  
The form that dominates the American West, and doubtless all of 
American culture, is a seismic form: a fractal, interstitial culture, born of a 
rift with the Old World, a tactile, fragile, mobile, superficial culture – you 
have to follow its own rules to grasp how it works (Baudrillard 1986, 10).  
 
 Baudrillard identifies America as a manifestation of the most advanced stage of 
simulation, that is, as lacking any grounding in a ―real‖ economy of value. As Baudrillard 
describes it, ―Americans may have no identity, but they have wonderful teeth‖ 
(Baudrillard 1986, 34). America has all the signs of culture, history, and identity. Yet if 
one looks closely, these qualities are nowhere to be found.   
 But Baudrillard may identify the nation, America, too closely with the process. 
This can be seen in his contrast between Europe and America. ―For the European, even 
today, America represents something akin to exile, a phantasy of emigration, and, 
therefore a form of interiorization of his or her own culture‖ (Baudrillard 1986, 75). 
America, according to Baudrillard, represents (for Europeans) a kind of exile from one‘s 
own sense of culture – an exile from reality.  America is a land without its own culture, a 
fascinatingly astral replica of the old world.  
 America functions, in Baudrillard‘s system, as the archetype expression of 
simulation and the fetishism of the object. It is a country without history, culture or 
identity. America is, for Baudrillard, already lost in the ―schizophrenia‖ of the network 
and the object as fetish. It is a place where representation and value have become 
impossible. In Baudrillard‘s America there is no longer a referent of value; there is only 
the fetish. Hence Baudrillard concludes, ―[America] is without hope‖ (Baudrillard 1986, 
121). Whether or not one agrees with Baudrillard, it is difficult to see America as 
anything other than a preview of the world‘s destiny in the age of late capitalism. Clearly, 
for Baudrillard, the hyperrealization of America is complete.  
 But is this America or the uneven global process of capitalist development that 
Baudrillard witnessed in America? If consumerism gives rise to simulation it would 
simply be logical to assume that uneven production and consumption patterns would lead 
to uneven development of simulation. If America is more simulated, and, therefore, less 
real than Europe, then the conclusion can only be that simulation is not evenly distributed 
across the globe. This means that there are places in the world that are less invested in the 
real than others. This offers proof that simulation is not globally homogeneous, but does 
not bring the conclusion that America has a fate that stands outside the process of 
fetishized production more generally.  
 Here, Baudrillard may come too close to identifying the fetishized nature of 
symbolic production with America. America is not the cause of the emerging globalizing 
network of production. It manifests itself in the West, and those (like Japan) that have 
moved to the production of symbolic commodities due to the satisfaction of the material 
conditions of reproduction within their domestic economies.  
 The ―American model‖ of production is determined by its integration into the 
network of fetishized production. Such a process is not a national phenomenon, as Marx 
understood, but determined by the conditions of capitalism more generally. It is an 
example of a society in which production of symbolic value emerges in its fullest 
manifestation as the satisfaction of material needs (at least for the majority), explored by 
Marx within the concept of use value, has given way within the economic system. 
Production, distribution, and consumption are determined by the network of symbolic 
exchange. This is a necessary development for capitalist production in order to rationalize 
the expansion of production in the face of increasing productivity of labor.  
 
 
IV. Baudrillard, Marx, and the Production of Symbolic Value 
 
 In Volume One of Capital, Marx describes what he means by the fetish. 
―Fetishism‖ is described as something that ―attaches itself to the products of labor, so 
soon as they are produced as commodities...‖ (Jordon 1971, 244). Hence, even in Marx 
there is the idea that products have a value beyond that assigned to them by their use or 
value in the process of exchange. Fetish value is symbolic, tied to the object as an 
expression of desire.  As Marx says in the Kölnische Zeitung, fetishism is ―the religion of 
the sensuous appetites‖ (Marx 1967, 115).  
 However, Marx does not really develop the concept of ―symbolic value.‖ In part, 
this may be explained by his materialism, which ultimately returns to use value to ground 
its discussion of production and social organization. For Marx, sign value may appear to 
lack true substance, unable to be a sufficient motivator of human activity.  
 Yet Marx‘s predictions on social change have not come true. Imperialist policies 
by the industrial states have kept the domestic conditions of the capitalist economies 
relatively stable. The working classes in the G-7 countries are not in upheaval, as Marx 
predicted, despite relatively flat salaries and living standards. However, one can begin to 
explain this by adding the notion of symbolic value to the Marxian concepts of use value 
and exchange value, and such an addition puts the present conditions of work, labor, 
technology and political stagnation in a new light.  
 The consumption of symbolic value has several features that assist it in 
maintaining the capitalist order. First, the goods consumed can be inexpensive and made 
widely available to the public. Second, the commodity need not have a particularly strong 
use value. This means that the object operates on the level of desire or seduction. One 
desires or is seduced by the object as possession, not the object as utility. As a result, 
symbolic commodities do not interfere with the circulation of use value. In fact, they 
circumvent the utility of use value as a force in maintaining political and economic 
control over the population (A fact well recognized by both Marx and Baudrillard).  
 There is another aspect of sign value that distinguishes it from use value. As a 
fetish is a commodity whose primary value is symbolic, it requires the construction of 
desire. The fetish must be ―sold‖ to the consumer in a way that bread and clothing need 
not. It requires a cultural industry that is both linked to the material desires of the 
working class, and to the capitalist system of production, distribution, and consumption.   
 Here we return to the Marxian concept of the fetish as a commodity that has use 
value for capital, because it both absorbs the excess capital of the working class, and 
provides a source of demand for the products of industrial capitalism. The fetish increases 
the circulation of capital in an economy where use value has largely been satisfied. The 
Baudrillardian project takes the Marxian concept of fetish to its logical extreme.    
 As is implicit in Marx‘s understanding of fetishism, the mass consumption of 
superfluous symbols keeps the engines of industry humming, long after the needs of 
those within the industrial state are satisfied. However, according to Baudrillard even this 
logic of the fetish must at some point give way to a higher order fetishism. Baudrillard 
suggests that the logic of capitalism will reach a point, as it has in America, in which the 
very structuring of value itself becomes a barrier to productivity, consumption, and 
capital. Thus, the capacity of fetishism to sustain the logic of capital increasingly comes 
to constitute capitalism itself. In the Baudrillardian system, capitalist productivity, 
consumption, and exchange have been freed from every possible barrier, even that of 
value. At the leading edge of contemporary capitalism, value increasingly gives way to a 
new kind of fetishism.   
 
 
V: Production and Politics in the Symbolic Order 
 
 Today, a political economy based on the production and reproduction of an 
endless chain of identical products has come to an end. Just as the system of production 
produced a mass of ―signs,‖ it also produced a human mass and the idea of universal 
humanity composed of identical creatures. Such a notion reinforced the ideas of equality 
and democracy, which were presented as preexisting sub-currents of society. Thus a 
notion of ―human rights‖ emerges as the Enlightenment mantra, (Baudrillard 2000, 21) as 
personal liberty emerges as the mirror image of wage-slavery. However, amid the 
celebration of universal humanity a fatal strategy unfolds.  
  The rise of the capitalist order brought about a culture in which production for 
exchange replaced production for self-sufficiency. Mass production was capable of 
generating abundance far beyond the needs of human beings. Consumer culture arises as 
the response, a culture in which the symbolic value of good can circulate at a rate that far 
exceeds the circulation of use value. In that way, capitalism continues to expand. 
 Here one can see Baudrillard‘s return to his Marxist roots in altered form. The rise 
of consumer culture and the simulational order are systems of domination. However, they 
represent a system in which both the working class and the bourgeoisie are ultimately 
subject to the dictates of the same economic imperatives. If the system of sign exchange 
knows no traditional class distinctions this is because, the modes of repression and 
integration of the simulation order are, in this regard, more comprehensive, more 
complete, and the prospects for liberation are less optimistic. Consumption integrates 
rather than alienates and takes on the form of a cultural or national duty that transcends 
affiliations of class. 
 The consumption of symbolic goods becomes the means to absorb excess 
production. It is not enough to have food, clothing, and shelter. One must have the 
―correct‖ and trendy commodities in order to be part of the march undertaken by the 
continual circulation of signs. This addendum to Marx explains how capitalism has 
continued to survive despite its ability to produce excess. The work force can only remain 
tied to the machinery of production if it believes that it must engage in the circulation of 
symbolic goods. Here, advertising has a critical role to play in the system of domination 
that emerges. 
 Baudrillard is pessimistic about the possibilities of resistance to the simulational 
order. This is the case because of both its pervasiveness within the advanced states, 
especially the United States, and because of its transparent nature. The self-referencing 
―truths‖ of a consumptive order obsessed with signs does not allow the dissemination of 
alternatives, which escape its symbolic ―code.‖ Further, such an order is very seductive. 
It is not clear that people would really want more time with their families and a less 
repressive political climate if it meant they had to abandon their cell phones and salad-
shooters. 
 These developments have transformed the activities of politics. Today there is 
barely even lip service to the idea of the social contract. With a sign economy, there is no 
longer the need to strike a bargain with the masses. State power now devourers the state‘s 
own people and cities, just as it once sought to destroy its enemies (Baudrillard 1993, 79). 
For Baudrillard, the contest today is between an infantile mass and a totalitarian system 
maintained by self-reference to the code (Baudrillard 1993, 78). The state uses new 
powers of simulation (the fusion of the military industrial complex and info-tainment 
elites) to further its power (Baudrillard 1993, 79). Even when it engages in the use of 
brutality, the state feels justified in criticizing those who react to its repression with 
violence (Baudrillard 1993, 78).  
 Resistance to institutional power in the age of control by the code, and a mass 
logic that hypnotically draws one toward fetishism takes various forms. The illicit use of 
narcotics is one reaction to the process of rationalization and forced submission to the 
dictates of a state power by the economy of the sign (Baudrillard 1993, 67). Terrorism is 
a reaction against the attempt at universalization, whether through political acquiescence, 
universal commodification, or genetic blueprinting. And neurosis (or what Baudrillard 
calls ―isophrenis‖) becomes another form of resistance to the madness presented by the 
current situation (Baudrillard 1993, 67). 
 Such resistance is personal, local, and immediate. It does not take the form of a 
new metanarrative, universal ethic, or construction of human identity. It is raw, 
unrefined, reactive energy. Thus, ―singularity‖ emerges as the form resistance takes 
within an increasingly predetermined, preordered, and preselected social order. 
Resistance is, for Baudrillard, neurosis struggling against madness (Baudrillard 1993, 
67). To paraphrase Nietzsche in this context, when the world is so ordered, when the code 
is so strongly engaged in a simulation of the real, all those who see the world for what it 
is will go voluntarily to the madhouse. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The significance of Baudrillard for the traditions of Marxism and critical theory 
cannot be denied. By developing the Marxian concept of the fetish, in his system of sign 
value, Baudrillard extends the explanatory power of the Marxian paradigm. The 
commodity possesses three values: use value, exchange value, and symbolic value. 
Symbolic value is what emerges with simulation. It is a product of the social 
transformation and change that has occurred with the rise of the new historical conditions 
of production and technology. However, Baudrillard does not simply stop with a 
structural analysis; rather he follows the logic of symbolic exchange and fetishism 
further, suggesting that there will soon be a time when the phenomenon of capitalism will 
be past the point of analysis, past the very possibility of being critically examined. In fact, 
he argues that this time has already come for America. 
 In a significant sense, Baudrillard represents a continuation of the Marxian project 
in a world that is losing the ability to critically examine its direction. Baudrillard 
continues the maxim represented in Marx, that the economic order is going to be a major, 
if not ―the‖ major influence in determining the direction of social institutions and 
activities. Thus, whether one agrees with the extremism of Baudrillard‘s argument or not, 
it is difficult to deny the existence of a kind of symbolic economy and its power to affect 
the social order.  
 However, when it comes to a strategy for resistance, Baudrillard is not Marx or 
Foucault. It is hard to see a positive program of political opposition emerging out of 
Baudrillard. His pessimism about the future is not matched with a plan for action. 
Resistance is personal and private. It does not take the form of a coherent political 
movement.  
 Baudrillard is more the messenger. However, from Baudrillard‘s analysis it is 
clear that any collective political response would have to include a serious examination 
and rejection of consumer culture. This would mean a confrontation with the ethos of the 
tendencies of late industrial capitalism. It is hard to imagine the triumph of such action 
under the current conditions, even if it is possible see what form such action should take. 
However, until such a strategy is formulated, we are likely to continue on until the last 
computer is unplugged and the last commercial has played. 
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